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In the spring of 1920 a sugar refining company which was
engaged in business in Pennsylvania entered into a number if
contracts for the sale of large quantities of sugar to be delivered
during the summer or fall. The contracts were negotiated
through different brokers who executed sales memoranda, speci-
fying in each case only the total quantity sold and the base price,
and giving the buyer the right to designate the proportions of
each grade desired. Between the time of the sales and the times
fixed for delivery the market price of sugar collapsed, and the
seller found that many of its customers were repudiating their
contracts. Actions upon these contracts brought in Pennsylvania
were uniformly unsuccessful,1 unless there had been part per-
formance,2 or defendant failed properly to plead the statute,3 the
Pennsylvania court holding that the memorandum did not comply
with the Statute of Frauds 4 in that it failed to state some of the
'Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Howell, 274 Pa. i9o, 118 Atl. 1O9 (1922);
Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Kane Milling & Grocery Co., 278 Pa. 1O5, 122 At!.
231 (1923) ; Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. John, 279 Pa. io4, 123 At. 685 (1924).
'Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Hanscom Bros., 273 Pa. 98, 116 Atl. 14o
(1922).
'Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Lykens Merc. Co., 274 Pa. 206, 117 At!. 78o
(1922).
'UNIFORM SALEs AcT, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 19652.
(933)
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terms of the contract, and trade usage could not supply the
omitted terms.5 Actions were also brought on similar contracts
in other jurisdictions. In all of these cases in which the conflict
of laws question was raised 6 the courts properly recognized that
the contracts were governed as to matters of substance by the
law of Pennsylvania, since they were made and were to be per-
formed in that state. The important question was whether the
requirement of a memorandum in writing affected the substance or
right so as to be governed by the proper law of the contract, or the
procedure or remedy so as to be governed by the law of the forum.
Three courts which considered this question decided that by the
law of Pennsylvania, the Statute of Frauds affected the right and,
therefore, held the memorandum insufficient. 7 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a case begun in Illinois
decided on authority of two earlier cases in that circuit, that the
statute affected the remedy and was governed by the law of the
forum. s In this case the court assumed that the law of the forum
should determine whether the Statute of Frauds affected the right
or the remedy. The courts which reached the opposite conclusion
looked to the lex loci contractus. Thus, each court, in selecting
the authorities on which it based its conclusion, assumed the con-
clusion.
The court also held that the notation that the goods were sold by the
broker was not a signing of the memorandum by the agent of the buyer, even if
the broker were authorized to contract for the buyer. In all of the cases in
other jurisdictions in which the memoranda were held sufficient, there were later
letters written by the buyers which were held to supply the lack of signature to
the memoranda. Thus no conflicts question arose on that feature of the cases.
6 In several cases recovery was allowed on these contracts in other jurisdic-
tions without any reference being made in the opinion to the conflict of laws
question or the Pennsylvania decisions. See Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Eger-
ton, 288 Fed. 698 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); Luray Supply Co., Inc. v. Franklin
Sugar Ref. Co., 6 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925); Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v.
William D. Mullen Co., 12 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926). This last case is
the more remarkable because it reversed a judgment of the District Court, 7 F.
(2d) 470 (D. Del. 1925) which was expressly based on the proposition that the
Pennsylvania law governed, and by that law the memorandum was insufficient.
'Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Holstein Harvey's Sons, Inc., 275 Fed. 622 (D.
Del. 1921); Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. William D. Mullen Co., supra note 6,
reversed by circuit court in Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. W. D. Mullen Co.,
supra note 6; Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Martin-Nelly Grocery Co., 94 W. Va.
504, 119 S. E. 473 (1923).
'Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Ref. Co., 8 F. (2d) 6oi (C. C. A.
7th, 1925).
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This is not an uncommon practice of courts in dealing with
this problem, i. e., whether a rule affects substance or procedure.
In St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Cox 9 an action was brought
in Arkansas to recover damages for personal injuries inflicted in
Missouri. The defendant pleaded a release executed by the
plaintiff in Missouri and alleged that under the laws of Missouri
plaintiff would have to tender repayment of the amount received
for the release before she could sue to cancel it for fraud. In
applying the Arkansas rule, that repayment of the consideration
was not a condition precedent to suit, but that credit for the
amount received must be allowed on any judgment recovered, the
court said:
"But the Missouri Supreme Court treats the matter of
tendering or refunding of the consideration received for the
release in such cases as 'a matter going to the basis of the
right of action itself.' It is a matter of substance, a con-
dition precedent to the maintenance of the action. But,
under our decisions, as above stated, a failure to refund or
make tender of the consideration for the release in such cases
relates only to the remedy, and is not a matter of substance
pertaining to the right of action itself."
Hoadley v. Northern Transportation Co.10 was an action
brought in Massachusetts against a common carrier to recover
for goods destroyed by the Chicago fire while they were in the
carrier's possession. The bill of lading contained a clause ex-
empting the carrier from all loss or damage by fire. The contract
for shipment was made in Illinois and it was not questioned that
the law of Illinois was the proper law of the contract. The jury
sustained plaintiff's contention that by the law of Illinois the mere
receipt of a bill of lading containing such a stipulation would not
raise a presumption that its terms were assented to. The Mas-
sachusetts rule, however, was stated to be that assent to the stipu-
lation may be inferred from such acceptance of the bill of lading.
The court held that the rule laid down in Illinois affected the
remedy only and did not apply where suit was brought in Massa-
9 171 Ark. 103, 283 S. W. 31 (1926).
10115 Mass. 304 (874).
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chusetts. It is not clear from the Illinois cases which were cited
to support the Illinois rule whether that rule is one of substance,
i. e., a rule that mere receipt does not amount to an assent to a
contract limiting the carrier's liability, or one of procedure, i. e.,
a rule that evidence of receipt is insufficient to support a finding
by a court or jury that there had been assent to such a contract. 1
If a similar action had later been brought in Massachusetts upon
a bill of lading issued after the enactment of the statute in Illinois
which made it unlawful for a carrier to limit its liability by any
stipulation or limitation expressed in the receipt,12 which statute
the Illinois court has held not to prevent the enforcement by Illi-
nois courts of such a limitation contained in a bill of lading issued
in another state,13 would the Massachusetts court then hold there
was no valid limitation of liability? Such a question was raised
in Missouri, and the court in that state treated the Massachusetts
case as "quite in point" but refused to follow it. 14  If the Massa-
chusetts view that the Illinois common law rule merely related to
an inference to be drawn from certain facts was sound, the en-
actment of the statute furnished a clear basis for distinguishing
the two cases. The Missouri opinion is another illustration of the
frequent failure of the courts to notice the necessity of deciding
what law shall determine whether a given rule is substance or
procedure.
"This, of course, is a common situation. Seldom does the court or legisla-
ture which formulates a rule of law consider the question whether such a rule is
substantive or procedural in the conflict of laws sense.
"Act March 12, 1874, ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1925) c. 27, p. 590, par. I.
"Coats v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 239 Ill. 154, 87 N. E. 929 (19o9).
Plaintiff's contention in that case appears to have been that the Illinois law ought
to govern because the contract was to be performed there. For the proposition
that the law of the place o.f making, rather than that of the place of delivery,
governed the question, the court cited Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Boyd, 91
IIl. 268 (1878), in which case the contract had been made in Massachusetts for
shipment to Chicago, and Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co., supra note io, was
cited to establish the Massachusetts rule that acceptance of a bill of lading
implied assent to limitation of liability stipulated therein, though that rule was
held inapplicable in the case under consideration because the bill of lading was
not issued and accepted until some time after the goods had been delivered to
the carrier. No mention is made of the further holding that the former Illinois
rule was one of procedure, from which it would follow that that rule ought to
apply in an action in Illinois on a foreign bill of lading even though the Illinois
statute did not.
" Hartman v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 39 Mo. App. 88 (189o).
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The text writers who have discussed this problem have ap-
parently assumed that a given rule of law, e. g., the parol evidence
rule, must be either substance or procedure. They do ordinarily
recognize that, although the usual Statute of Limitations is gen-
erally held to affect the remedy only and not the right, a state
may enact a statute which has the effect of terminating the right
upon the expiration of a prescribed period of time, and that such
statute will be given effect wherever the action may be brought."5
They also note that a distinction has been made by some courts
between a Statute of Frauds which says "no action shall be
brought" on a contract not evidenced by written memorandum,
and one which says "no contract shall be allowed to be good,"
but they generally disapprove the distinction. 16 If statutes of
different jurisdictions which deal with the same general problem
may in some cases deal with it by prescribing a rule of substantive
law, and in other cases by prescribing a rule of procedure, we must
recognize the possibility that the common law rules of different
jurisdictions may do likewise, unless we are prepared to take the
position that there exists a general common law, independent of
the common law of any one jurisdiction and that conflict of laws
questions are to be decided by reference to this general common
law. Although this position finds support in some of the opinions
of the courts, 17 it is so inconsistent with our present-day concep-
tions of law that it cannot be accepted as an hypothesis for any
critical examination of a legal problem.
The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws does recognize that
there is a preliminary problem involved in these substance or pro-
cedure cases and provides:
"The forum determines what is matter of procedure
and what is matter of substance according to its own law." 18
STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) § 582; 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (3d ed. i9o5) § 536; MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS (i9oi) § 210; GooD-
RIcH, CONFLICT OF LAws (927) §§ 86, 87; DictaY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed.
1927) 799, 8oo.
" 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 15, § 689 et seq.; MINOR, loc. cit. supra
note 15; Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 15, § 88; Dicey, op. cit. supra note 15, 8oo.
'7For a recent extreme statement of this position, see Slaton v. Hall, i68
Ga. 710, 715, 148 S. E. 741, 743 (1929).
" CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEmENT, TENTATIvE DRAFT NO. 5 (Am. L.
INST. 1929) § 613.
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The meaning of this section seems to be obscured rather than
clarified by the comment thereon,'9 but, on its face, it appears to
assume that certain rules or principles of law must, regardless
of the varying form they may take in different jurisdictions, be
always either substance or procedure. The statement of the com-
ment that the forum "will not enquire whether the foreign court
would call the various rules involved in the transaction substan-
tive or procedural" is manifestly contrary to the general theory
of the Restatement that in the field of conflict of laws one deals
principally with the jurisdiction of states to create rights, and
the enforcement of the rights so created in other jurisdictions.
20
It is true that this general theory is not followed to the extent
of a general acceptance of renvoi 21 but that departure is justified
by the practical impossibility of reaching any solution where both
jurisdictions adopt the renvoi.22  With reference to questions of
status and title to land where that practical objection does not ex-
ist, the Restatement requires the forum to decide the question as it
" Ibid. comment to § 613•
(a) The court determines what is procedure and what is substance accord-
ing to the law it administers and not as an isolated question of fact in each
instance. This law it is the function of this Chapter to expound, and illustra-
tions of the application of the law are shown in the sections of this Chapter.
(b) The rule stated in this Section is in accordance with the general princi-
ple (Section 5) that a court applies its own law of the Conflict of Laws.
(c) The forum, in determining in accordance with its own law whether an
element of a foreign transaction is matter of substance or procedure, will exam-
ine the entire nature of the transaction, including the statute or principle of law
which created the alleged right and the interpretation thereof; but will not
enquire whether the foreign court would call the various rules involved in the
transaction substantive or procedural. Then, supposing all the law and facts of
the case as established had been law of or facts occurring in the state of forum,
it will determine as to each rule whether it calls it procedural or substantive.
I CONFLICT OF LAWS, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2 (Am. L. INsT. 1926) § 43.
'Ibid. § 7. There seems to be no logical escape from the proposition that
the theory that conflict of laws deals with the enforcement of foreign created
rights requires a decision of the question which is the same as would be reached
by the courts of the jurisdiction in which the rights originated. See Cook,
Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457, 468.
We have no other test to determine what those rights are. The fact that courts
ordinarily look only to the local law of that jurisdiction, as pointed out by Pro-
fessor Cook in Recognition of "Massachusetts Rights" by New York Courts
(1919) 28 YALE L. J. 67, does not imply that they would continue to do so if
the conflicts rule of the governing jurisdiction were brought to their attention.
See Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada, 188 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 8th, i9i1).
2-In re Tallmadge lO9 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1919) ; Lorenzen,
Renvoi Doctrine in Conflict of Laws (1918) 27 YAE L. J. 509; Schreiber, The
Doctrine of Renvoi in Anglo-American Law (1918) 31 HAR. L. REV. 523.
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would be decided by a court of the jurisdiction whose law is de-
termined to be the proper governing law.23  The same conclusion
should be reached when the question is one of substance or pro-
cedure for on such a question there can be no perpetual succes-
sion of references by one law to the other and then back again.
If the courts of the jurisdiction whose law is the proper govern-
ing law hold that a given rule or principle of law of that jurisdic-
tion is one of substance, they would not refer the question to the
law of any other jurisdiction; if they held it to be one of pro-
cedure, they would not expect it to apply to a suit in another juris-
diction.
Even if we reject the "vested rights" theory, and accept the
view of those who hold that in all cases the court enforces only
rights created by its own law, we should reach the same result in
determining the extent of the right for the foreign law and the
rights created by it are operative facts which the court should
consider.24 It certainly cannot be contended that in a conflict of
laws case the court is to decide solely on the basis of what it con-
ceives to be just, or socially expedient with reference alone to
that particular controversy between those two parties. Such a
procedure would disregard entirely the social interests which de-
mand that law be certain and predictable. Those interests our
common law technique recognizes by requiring the courts, in
reaching their decisions, to apply to the facts principles which
have been developed by past experience and tested in numerous
cases. In the field of conflict of laws there is no principle better
established than that the substantive rights and obligations of the
parties, which have arisen because of some completed transaction,
should not be affected by the subsequent selection of the forum in
which redress is sought, whether that selection results from the
voluntary choice of the plaintiff or is compelled by the necessity
of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Even
though all do not agree with the statement of Lord Eyre:
0 Op. cit. supra note 20, § 8.
Cook, op. cit. supra note 21; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and
the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YA=E L. J. 743; Stumberg, Foreign Created
Rights (1930) 8 TEx. L. REv. 173.
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"I cannot conceive that what is no personal obligation
in the country in which it arises, can ever be raised into a
personal obligation by the laws of another, .... ") 25
everyone should agree that it should not be raised into an obli-
gation unless exceptional circumstances so require.
Concerning the sugar contracts referred to at the beginning
of this article, 26 it would seem quite clear that any lawyer who
was consulted by one of the buyers would feel safe in advising
his client that the question was governed by the laws of Penn-
sylvania, where the contract was both made and to be performed,
and that, by the decisions of the highest court of that state, the
memorandum was not sufficient to make the contract binding.
Both the client and the attorney would be justified in resenting,
after the client had acted on such advice, a federal decision that
the contract was binding merely because service on the client could
be obtained in another jurisdiction which regarded the Statute
of Frauds as affecting the remedy only and which did not have a
statute as strict as that of Pennsylvania, or did not place as strict
a construction upon it.
Those courts in other jurisdictions which contented them-
selves with looking at the Pennsylvania law and finding that such
law, as a matter of substance, held that such contracts were not
binding, or at least that breach of them did not give rise to a
secondary right to recover damages if defendant chose to rely
on the Statute of Frauds,27 were, therefore, correctly applying
the principles pertinent to the situation. The court which dis-
cussed the law of the forum as affecting the remedy2s did not
meet the first problem involved in that suit; only if a cause of
action exists does it become material to determine whether the
procedural rules of the forum permit the enforcement of such
cause of action.
Melan v. Fitzjames, i Bos. & P. 138, 141 (Eng. 1797).
Supra notes 1-8.
Supra note 7.
"Supra note 8. In this case the statute of the forum was the same as that
of Pennsylvania, but had been construed differently.
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In the release case presented to the Arkansas court 29 it is
apparent that, before suit was begun in Arkansas, the Missouri
right of action was barred by the release and that bar would con-
tinue until a return of the consideration given for the release was
tendered. The bringing of the suit in Arkansas ought not to
change the substantive rights and obligations of the parties.
While the mode of pleading and proof by which such tender can
be shown in the Arkansas court is governed by Arkansas law,
the making of the tender ought still to remain a condition prece-
dent to any right of action.
After the court has determined that, by the proper law gov-
erning the transaction, there is a recognized right of action to
support the suit, it can then look to its own law to determine
whether any of its procedural rules prevent the successful prose-
cution of the action in that forum. Keeping these two questions
thus separate would have the great practical advantage of making
obvious the effect of the judgment upon subsequent proceedings
in another jurisdiction. If the decision is only that some pro-
cedural rule of the forum prevents maintenance of the action, the
judgment can never be pleaded as a bar to an action elsewhere,
whereas the determination that no substantive right existed, if
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, would be conclusive
on that question everywhere.
This approach does not, of course, eliminate all of the diffi-
culties which have confused courts in dealing with this question.
Whether the law of another state on a given subject is one which
affects substance or procedure in the conflict of laws sense is a
question which will seldom be found to have been decided by
the courts of that state, and the language in which the rule is
stated, either by the court or legislature, having ordinarily been
chosen without considering the conflict of laws problem, is not
a safe guide for the solution of that problem.30  The only ade-
'Supra note 9.
" The holding of Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 8oi (Eng. 1852), that the
fourth section of the Statute of Frauds which relates to contracts for the sale
of goods provides that "no action shall be brought" on such a contract unless
there is compliance with the statutory requirements, establishes a rule of pro-
cedure, and that a distinction should be made between that section and other
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quate method for reaching a satisfactory conclusion is to exam-
ine the statute or rule in the light of the evils which led to its en-
actment or promulgation, the policy which underlies it, and all
the consequences which have resulted from it.31
It cannot be safely assumed that the distinction between right
and remedy adopted for other purposes, is always applicable in
conflicts cases. It has been suggested that the test, determinative
of whether the law of the forum affects remedy only, is this: if
the law were a statute of the proper law of the transaction, enacted
subsequent thereto, could it be constitutionally applied to that
transaction without destroying vested rights? 32 But there is at
least one obvious distinction between the two situations. Even a
statute which admittedly affects the remedy only cannot be ap-
plied to a past transaction, if the effect of such application is to
cut off all remedy in that jurisdiction,33 while no state is under
any obligation to furnish a remedy for, or even a tribunal for
the determination of, claimed rights originating under foreign
laws.
34
Even if we find a precedent for holding a certain rule of
one jurisdiction to be either of substance or of procedure, we must
guard against the fallacy of assuming that such precedent is
authority for a determination that the rule does not also affect
procedure or substance. Where a court has held that a rule of
its own jurisdiction does not apply to an action brought therein
on a foreign cause of action for the reason that its rule is one
sections which state "no contract shall be allowed to be good," has been criti-
cized. See 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note I5, §§ 69oa-69od; GooDRICh, op. cit.
supra note 15, § 88. Page, Effect of Failure to Comply with Wisconsin Statute
of Frauds (1927) 4 Wis. L. REv. 324, shows that a change in the language of a
New York section of the Statute of Frauds, which was copied in Wisconsin, and
which was construed to make that section affect the right, apparently was made
by the revisers of the New York statutes without any purpose of changing the
law.
.For an excellent illustration of the use of this method, see Lorenzen, The
Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 311, 320-331.
MINOR, op. cit. supra note 15, § 18o.
12 C. J. 974 et seq.
Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373, 24
Sup. Ct. 92 (1903). Apparently no state has undertaken to enforce a right
under a foreign compensation act unless that act provides for action in court
instead of proceedings before a commission. See Dwan, Workmen's Compensa-
tion and the Conflict of Laws (1927) II MINN. L. REv. 329, 331.
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affecting the substance,3 5 the real holding is that it does not
affect the procedure; likewise, where a court holds that a rule of
another jurisdiction does not apply to an action before it, based
on a cause originating in the other jurisdiction, for the reason that
such rule is one affecting the procedure, 6 the real holding is that
the rule does not affect the substance. On the other hand, where
a court holds a rule of its own to be one of procedure and, there-
fore, applicable to an action on a foreign cause of action," or
holds a rule of another jurisdiction to be one of substance and,
therefore, applicable to a transaction occurring in the other juris-
diction for which action is brought in the forum,38 we cannot logi-
cally deduce therefrom that the former rule is not also one affect-
ing substance, or that the latter does not also affect procedure.
Both analysis and authority show that the same rule of a given
jurisdiction may, and often does, affect both substance and pro-
cedure. It is this fact that leads to most of the difficulty in this
portion of the field of conflict of laws, and the failure to consider
this fact has led to much of the confusion therein.
Legal rights have been classified into primary, secondary
and remedial rights.39 To these might be added procedural rights
auxiliary to the remedial right, or right of action, such as rights
to certain process, rights to be heard by attorney and to testify,
etc. Clearly primary rights are substantive, procedural rights
are procedural. 40  It is more difficult to say how rights of the
two intervening groups should be classified, but if we accept the
classification which treats secondary rights as substantive and
Baxter Nat. Bank v. Talbot, 154 Mass. 213, 28 N. E. 163 (189I) ; Coats v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., supra note 13.
Downer v. Chesbrough 36 Conn. 369 (1869).
Hoadley v. Northern Transport Co., supra note IO.
Hartman v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., supra note 14.
GooDicH, op. cit. supra note 15, § 81.
The holding of Atchinson, T., & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Spencer, 2o F. (2d) 714
(C. C. A. 9th, 1927), that a statute of the state in which the trial was held which
required the issue of contributory negligence in all -cases to be submitted to the
jury, affects the substance has been generally criticized. See (I927) 41 HAav.
L. REv. 254; (928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 263; (1927) 6 N. C. L. R v. IO2. The
argument in (1928) 26 Micx. L. REV. 573 in favor of this holding is based on
the view that the rule that the law of the forum governs matters of procedure
should be abrogated or, at least, applied only where absolutely necessary to pre-
serve orderly procedure in the court, rather than on any construction of the rule
in question as one of substance in the analytical sense.
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remedial rights as procedural, which is logically defensible and in
accord with the weight of authority,41 we have made our division
between substance and procedure at the point in our analytical
scheme where the distinction between the two becomes the most
blurred.
For example, suppose defendant has contracted to sell to
plaintiff a chattel, the contract being made and performable in
state X, and the chattel situated there, so that the law of that
state clearly governs the substantive rights of the parties. De-
fendant has become insolvent, and plaintiff brings suit in state Y
for specific performance of the contract. By the law of state X
insolvency of the defendant is considered to make the remedy at
law inadequate so that equity may decree performance of such a
contract; by the law of state Y insolvency does not have that
effect. That rule of state X gives, because of the breach of plain-
tiff's primary right to performance of the contract, a secondary
right to a decree for specific performance, or to specific repara-
tion for the breach. In the Anglo-American system the exist-
ence of that secondary right is only possible if it is accompanied
by a remedial right in a court of equity. We cannot, therefore,
say that a rule on this subject affects secondary right only nor
that it affects remedy only; it affects both.42 Our only logical way
out of the dilemma is to say that in so far as it affects the secondary
right the rule of state X ought to govern; in so far as it affects
the remedial right the rule of state Y ought to govern. In other
words, the plaintiff has a valid secondary right to specific per-
formance, but that right cannot be enforced in state Y because
the remediat right is governed by the law of the forum, and that
law, by denying access to its courts of equity in such a case, has
denied the existence of such remedial right.
" GooDRIrcH, op. cit. supra note 15, § 91; Note (193o) 14 MINN. L. REv. 665.
' No case has come to notice in which a court has been required to deter-
mine whether a rule allowing or refusing specific performance is one of sub-
stance or procedure. 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 15, § 498, says specific
pertormance is governed by the law fixed for the performance of the contract,
thereby implying that it is a question of substance, though his attention was not
then directed to the distinction between substance and procedure. Diczy, op. cit.
supra note 15, 802, says the right to specific performance is governed by the lex
fori. Neither author cites any cases in support of his statement.
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It may also be that the right to specific performance gives
to the plaintiff in state X an equitable title to the chattel which, it
would seem, should be classified as a primary right. That title,
then, should be recognized and protected in state Y after the
chattel has been taken into that state.
On the other hand, the determination of whether the second-
ary right is one for specific performance or one for damages for
the breach of the primary right determines also the existence
or non-existence of many procedural rights. It is apparent, then,
that we cannot say without qualification that the rule of state X,
that insolvency of the seller of a chattel makes the remedy at law
inadequate so that a court of equity may decree specific perform-
ance of the contract, is a rule of substance only, or a rule of pro-
cedure only; it affects both.
Conversely, there are situations where a rule which seems
to be clearly substantive has procedural consequences. Probably
all would agree that the rule of Wisconsin, that a scroll on a
document with the word "seal" written inside it is sufficient to
make the document a sealed instrument, is a rule of substantive
law. But if a deed, so sealed, contains covenants of warranty,
and an action for breach of such covenants is brought in a juris-
diction where the common law forms of action are still in use,
it is equally clear that the question whether the proper form of
action is covenant on an instrument under seal or assumpsit on
a simple contract is a question of the law of the forum. Thus,
the United States Supreme Court has held in a case in which the
law of the forum held such a scroll not to be a seal that the proper
form of action was assumpsit, though admitting'that, for the
purpose of determining compliance with the requirement of both
the law of Wisconsin and the law of the forum that a deed to
land must be under seal to be valid, the Wisconsin definition of
a seal must be applied.
4 3
"Le Roy v. Beard, 8 How. 45, (U. S. 1850). Accord: Steele v. Curie,
4 Dana 381 (Ky. 1836); Trasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 (Md. 1831);
McClees v. Burt, 5 Metc. 198 (Mass. 1842); Douglas v. Oldham, 6 N. H. iso
(1833); Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239 (N. Y. i8io); Andrews v. Herriot, 4
Cow. 4o8 (N. Y. 1825). In Watson v. Brewster, i Pa. 381 (1845), it was held
that the Statute of Limitations affected procedure and, therefore, it did not run
against an instrument which was under seal according to the lex fori, though it
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The ordinary Statutes of Limitations are generally held to
govern procedure and not substance, and undoubtedly the fear
that judicial decisions and particularly verdicts of juries could
not safely be based on testimony as to transactions long past had
a great influence on the enactment of such statutes. In so far as
that reason persists, it is proper to apply the law of the forum, and
refuse to entertain an action after the lapse of time prescribed by
the law of the forum, even though a longer time is allowed by
the proper law governing the substance of the transaction. How-
ever, it is quite clear that the running of the statutory time pre-
scribed by the law of the transaction terminates the secondary
right, even if it does not destroy the primary right. In accord-
ance with this view Judge Story argued that a cause of action
barred by the statute in force where it accrued should be barred
everywhere, but he felt constrained by precedent to hold that the
statute affected only the remedy and that the statute of the forum
alone applied.4 4  The position advocated by Judge Story has been
adopted by statute in many states 45 and is further vindicated by
the increasing tendency of courts to construe the Statute of Limi-
tations of the place where the cause of action accrued as one con-
ditioning the right and not merely barring the remedy. 46 The
result of both the statutes and the decisions to this effect is to
require the action to be brought within the period limited either
by the law of the forum or the law of the state in which the trans-
action was effected, whichever is the shorter, since the remedy is
terminated by the former law or the right by the latter.
was only a simple contract according to the proper law of the contract. 2
WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 15, § 747, groups with these cases others which
apply the law of the forum to the determination of the necessity for pleading
and proving consideration for an instrument which is not sealed, according to
the law of the forum, but is according to the proper law of the contract: an-
other illustration of the confusion resulting from failure t6 recognize that the
same principle of law may affect both substance and procedure.
.LeRoy v. Crowminshield, 2 Mason 15, (C. C. Mass. 182o).
'Note (i9oo) 48 L. R. A. 625, 639.
""The ordinary limitations of actions are treated as laws of procedure, and
as belonging to the lex fori, as affecting the remedy only, and not the right. But
in cases where it has been possible to escape from that qualification by a reason-
able distinction, courts have been willing to treat limitations of time as standing
like other limitations, and cutting down the defendant's liability wherever he is
sued." Holmes J., in Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct. 692 (1904).
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The original Statute of Frauds was likewise made necessary
by the inability of our courts, because of the trial by jury and
the restrictions on testimony by parties, to prevent the defraud-
ing of innocent parties through the fabrication of perjured tes-
timony as to the existence or terms of oral contracts. The diffi-
culties which led to its enactment were procedural, but its effect
was to deny at least any secondary right, as well as to deny any
remedial right. On the other hand, the policy against permitting
the substantive rights of the parties to be affected by the subse-
quent selection of the forum, which is particularly strong with
reference to commercial contract rights, is violated by refusing
relief on a foreign contract, valid by the proper law governing
it, but which fails to comply with the Statute of Frauds of the
forum. Perhaps the most satisfactory solution of this difficulty
was suggested by the Minnesota court in an action brought on
the guaranty of an Iowa lease.47 There was no question but that
the proper law of the guaranty as well as of the lease was Iowa
law for both were made in Iowa and to be performed there, and
the leased premises were situated there. The guaranty was in
writing and complied with the Iowa Statute of Frauds, but it
did not state the consideration, as required by the Minnesota stat-
ute. The court noticed that the main object of the statute was
"to circumvent the occasion for perjury and consequent fraud
by providing for written evidence in respect to certain contracts",
but also was keenly aware that the lease and guaranty had been
drawn with only the Iowa law in mind and that to deny relief
because of the Minnesota statute would be an injustice. It held
that, at least in actions on contracts made in other states where
a Statute of Frauds was in force, the requirement of a writing,
and the determination of its sufficiency, were matters of substance
to be governed by the proper law of the contract, and not by the
law of the forum. Is not that equivalent to a holding that the
statute of the forum is procedural in so far only as it is necessary
to protect procedural policy against the danger of perjured testi-
mony, and that in other respects it is a substantive regulation of
'-alloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W. iO82
(1917).
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the formal requisites of a contract, which does not apply to for-
eign contracts ?
This solution of the problem meets the objection that has
been made 48 to holding that one statute is procedural and another
substantive, namely that under such holdings we might have an
oral contract governed by the law where the former statute was
in force, on which action is brought where the latter is in force
so that the action would be maintainable because neither statute
applied to that contract.4 9 Under the reasoning herein suggested,
the fact that the statute of the forum had, in other cases, been
construed to affect the substance, would not preclude a holding
that it also affected the procedure at least to the extent of requir-
ing some written evidence of the contract.
A similar method of approach will aid in solving the other
problems in this field of the conflict of laws. Those problems are
difficult mainly because the rules involved in them actually do
affect both substance and procedure, and any attempt to say they
affect only one or the other produces confusion and disagree-
ment. To recognize that they do affect both, and to apply the
proper law of the transaction to the determination of what pri-
mary and secondary rights arose out of the transaction, either
because that is a logical consequence of the common law prin-
ciple of the territoriality of law, or because of the fundamental
policy that substantive rights of the parties shall not depend on
the subsequent choice of the forum, and then to apply the law
of the forum only to the extent necessary to preserve its pro-
cedural policies, ought to lead to a reduction, if not to the entire
elimination, of this confusion and disagreement. Such an ap-
proach, by keeping prominently before the courts the practical
effect of denying relief on foreign causes of action, should also
lead to a lessening of the area over which Anglo-American law
has extended the scope of its procedure.50
2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 15, § 6gob.
49 Marie v. Garrison, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. i57 (188o), 13 Abbott's N. C. 21o
(1883), apparently so holds.
' Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (923) 32
YALE L. J. 311, 327 et seq.
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As a result of this approach, also, we eliminate the prelimi-
nary problem of ascertaining what law is to determine whether a
given rule is substance or procedure, not by assuming, as has often
been the case, the solution of that problem in the determination of
the main problem, but by recognizing that no one law need clas-
sify the rule as one or the other for all situations. The law of
the transaction should be employed to determine how far its
applicable rules affect the substantive rights of the parties, while
the law of the forum determines how far its applicable rules affect
the procedure for enforcing whatever rights may have been given
by the law of the transaction.
